Climbing sand: Russia’s faltering advance in Africa’s Sahel

For years, Russia has sought to establish itself as a power broker in Africa, using the Sahel as a showcase for its ambitions. But the Kremlin’s push for influence in this volatile region is meeting growing headwinds. Russia is confronting military setbacks, fraying alliances, and a tide of discontent among civilian populations.

The Wagner Group, a shadowy paramilitary outfit acting as Moscow’s cat’s paw in Africa, initially seemed to offer a potent blend of muscle and lack of official connection to the Kremlin. Deployed in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, Wagner mercenaries provided security for fragile regimes while securing Russian access to valuable resources such as gold and diamonds. However, the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023 marked a turning point. Wagner has since been integrated into the Russian state, with its African operations now overseen by Russia’s Ministry of Defense and rebranded as the Africa Corps. 

Mali, which embraced Wagner after severing ties with its former French allies, is emblematic of Russia’s troubles. Initially, Wagner promised to quell the insurgencies plaguing the region, but their brutal methods and operational failures have worsened instability. Reports of massacres, arbitrary detentions, and extrajudicial killings have fueled resentment among local populations. Meanwhile, jihadist groups, far from being vanquished, have intensified their attacks. Wagner’s heavy-handed tactics, devoid of any long-term strategy, have alienated the very communities needed to stabilize Mali.

In the wake of Prigozhin’s death, Moscow moved swiftly to consolidate control over Wagner’s fragmented empire. Fighters were offered contracts with the Ministry of Defense, bringing them under the umbrella of state authority. This integration aims to standardize operations and reduce the risks of rogue activities that tarnished Russia’s reputation in Africa. Yet the transition has been fraught with challenges, including leadership gaps and a lack of the tactical flexibility that once defined Wagner’s operations.

Similar patterns are emerging elsewhere. In the CAR, Wagner fighters—now operating under direct Kremlin oversight—have been implicated in human rights abuses, sparking international condemnation. In Sudan, mercenary support for warring factions in the ongoing civil conflict have further undermined Russia’s image as a stabilizing force. Across the Sahel, anti-Russian sentiment is growing. Civilian populations, initially hopeful that Moscow might offer a more effective alternative to Western powers, are now reconsidering. Protests against Russian forces have erupted in several capitals, often led by disillusioned youth. 

Russia’s African gambit increasingly rests on an unsteady foundation. While Moscow may have gained temporary footholds, its inability to deliver sustainable security or foster genuine state partnerships has eroded its influence. The Sahel’s challenges—poverty, weak governance, and entrenched insurgencies—require nuanced solutions, not brute force. As frustration with Russia grows, the Kremlin’s setbacks in the Sahel could compromise its wider Africa strategy.

For Africa’s leaders, Moscow’s difficulties underscore a hard truth: external actors—whether from Paris, Washington, or Moscow—rarely deliver lasting peace.

*Lonzo Cook is a journalist and writer. He spent two decades at CNN in a series of senior editorial and management roles including leading breaking news operations across Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. In addition to writing on international affairs, national security and business, he works with media companies and corporations on how to evolve and create content to stay relevant to key audiences.