Russia’s uneven relationship with the Maghreb

Russia’s uneven relationship with the Maghreb
Kieran Baker

Last weekend, after the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad, a Russian cargo plane departed from Russia's air base in the Syrian port city of Latakia for Libya. It was a potent reminder that Russia exerts considerable influence over the North African country. It follows recent reporting by the UK’s Telegraph that revealed, at three Libyan air bases, the presence of Russian military transport aircraft, updated runways, and newly constructed buildings. Russia’s military presence in Libya is growing significantly as does the relationship between General Khalifa Haftar, who commands the eastern and southern regions of the country, and the Russian president. It follows reporting earlier in the year, that there were significant quantities of military equipment, including armored personnel carriers, and rocket launchers, that were offloaded from Russian vessels at the port of Tobruk, sourced from the Russian-controlled port of Tartus in Syria.

Russia’s presence in Libya is nothing new, nor is its ongoing outreach to the region, which has successfully exploited some frustrations with the West. Yet it has continually encountered difficulties in navigating interrelations and rivalries. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia—have all become of increasing interest to Russian engagement and influence. Moscow understands their strategic value, especially in terms of arms sales, energy, and, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, trade (largely to compensate for market shares lost to Western sanctions). 

So, what does the relationship with the region really look like?  Russia’s engagement in the Maghreb is centered on two main countries: Algeria and Libya. Regarding Algeria, Russian efforts have focused on securing hydrocarbon deals and boosting exports of Russian arms, which are currently around an estimated 70 percent of the Algerian military inventory. Yet, Russia has not always been able to significantly influence the relationship with this well recognized nonaligned power. For example, at the United Nations, Algeria has not gone along with the other pro-Russian states, such as Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, and Syria, in defending Moscow’s actions during the Ukraine war. 

For Libya, there are historic ties with Russia, deeply rooted in the Cold War period. Russia’s goals now however, are broadly seen to be returning to the economic benefits it enjoyed under the Gaddafi era through infrastructure and energy deals, as well as looking to counter European diplomatic influence on Libya’s fragile political state. Clearly it is establishing military bases and logistical hubs by the Mediterranean, where it can potentially threaten NATO’s southern flank, and Libya also serves Russia’s interests for its power projection into the Sahelian states to the south. 

When it comes to Morocco and Tunisia things are more nuanced; Morocco steers a middle course while Tunisia, since President Saied came to power, has increasingly looked to cultivate closer ties with Russia in the face of growing Western pressure, but hedges its bets by maintaining strong relations with China, Europe, the Gulf states, Iran, and the United States. 

All in all, Russia is pushing its own agenda, as nation states tend to do, but its impact has been mixed. What does seem certain, is that Russia will play a role in North Africa for many years to come.

*Kieran Baker is an Emmy award winning journalist who has started up various networks including Al Jazeera English, Bloomberg TV Africa and TRT World. 

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