Weakening of Iran’s Proxies Will Reshape Region Far Beyond the Levant

By Gavin Serkin

Israeli strikes devastating Iran’s proxy militias raise a pivotal question for the Maghreb and North Africa: Does erosion of Tehran’s influence herald greater regional stability or a new category of chaos? 

What is beyond doubt is that the recent elimination of senior figures in Hamas and Hezbollah have humiliated the Iranian regime and weakened Tehran's control overseas. Iran has long relied on groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen to project power across the region. Their military and political presence has enabled Tehran to exert influence far beyond its borders into Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and beyond.

Yet, now, Israel’s successful assaults on Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in Lebanon and the Hamas leadership in Gaza have dealt Iran’s regional aspirations an existential blow. Domestically, the Iranian leadership is already under massive pressure, with economic struggles from the effects of sanctions and hardline anti-protestor tactics deepening covert social resistance. Whether or not recent events provide sufficient impetus to advance revolution in Iran, the nation’s direct external influence is on the wane.  

Appealing as this unfolding scenario might appear, any relief for the wider region from a weakened Iran could be short-lived. Rather than bringing greater stability, a dismantling of Iran’s proxy militias is just as likely to create dangerous power vacuums, unleash retaliatory asymmetric warfare, and open the door for more volatile regional dynamics with new, unpredictable forces. 

Egypt’s Stake

As Iran’s direct influence through its conventional proxies weakens, Tehran is more likely to shift its strategy towards indirect tactics like sabotage, cyberattacks, and the use of smaller, decentralized militant groups to influence the region. Iran’s track record of disrupting key infrastructure, with attacks on shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf region, for example, is well-established.  

The recent spate of attacks by Houthis in Yemen targeting vessels in the Red Sea in a show of solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza should heighten concerns that key global trade routes, such as the Suez Canal, could become prime targets in an escalated conflict. With 12% of the world’s trade passing through Suez, any disruption could have detrimental consequences not only for Egypt but for world economy.  

However, the most immediate and multifaceted risk for Egypt lies to the east of Suez in the Sinai Peninsula. The region has long been a hotspot for extremist activity, with groups like ISIS operating within its borders. In recent years, there have been waves of violence, including attacks on Egyptian military and police forces. Hezbollah’s extensive network of militant ties across the region could enable Iran to reignite dormant groups, raising the level of risk Egypt faces from its own volatile border regions. As extremist elements capitalize on regional instability, the danger increases of weapons trafficking and militant infiltration all along Egypt’s borders.

Spillover into the Maghreb

While Egypt is burdened with the most immediate risks, the broader North Africa and Maghreb region must also brace itself for potential spillover effects. In this context, Libya is especially vulnerable. Divided between rival factions, the country’s ongoing civil conflict has made it a hub for militant activities, weapons trafficking and human smuggling, with external powers such as Turkey, Russia and Egypt playing significant roles in backing competing factions. Intense regional instability could serve to boost arms smuggling to militant groups constantly searching for fresh supplies. 

Algeria’s non-interventionist foreign policy, rooted in the nation’s struggle for independence from France with support from several Arab countries, has driven its refusal to align overtly with military or diplomatic coalitions against Iran, Israel or any other nation, instead prioritizing its own internal security and sovereignty. However, jihadist groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have exploited the power vacuums created by regional conflicts and threaten Algeria’s southern borders. Although Algeria has invested heavily in border security and counterterrorism operations, increased instability in the Sahel could pressure the government to reexamine its historic non-alignment doctrine.

Tunisia, still reeling from political upheaval since the 2011 Arab Spring, is also vulnerable to external pressures. Since the uprising that ousted longtime President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia’s politics have become destabilised by internal divisions, economic stagnation and the rise of Islamist political movements, such as the Ennahda party. The country has struggled with terrorism, especially in regions near the Libyan border given the proliferation of arms trafficking amongst militant groups. With a weak economy and fragile political structures, Tunisia is at risk of further destabilization should regional tensions escalate. 

Diplomatic initiative

From a Moroccan perspective, on the other hand, embroiled in a territorial dispute over Western Sahara since 1975, there are grounds for some optimism. The conflict pits Morocco against the Polisario Front, a Sahrawi nationalist movement seeking independence for the region. The dispute has long been a flashpoint in North African geopolitics, complicating Morocco’s relations with neighbouring Algeria (which supports the Polisario) and much of the African Union. Most notably, Morocco has accused Iran of exacerbating the Western Sahara conflict by supplying arms to the Polisario Front through Hezbollah, prompting Rabat to sever diplomatic ties with Tehran in 2018. While Iran has denied these allegations, the dispute underlines Morocco’s concerns about growing Iranian influence in the region.  

While Morocco may have an opportunity to strengthen its control over Western Sahara, potentially resolving one of the region’s long-standing conflicts, the overall risk of heightened disruption makes it imperative for Egypt and the Maghreb countries to coordinate urgent diplomatic and military actions to safeguard their own interests. Egypt, with its strategic position and alliances with regional powers like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel, is in a strong position to lead international efforts to de-escalate tensions in this turbulent period. This will require more than military might. It demands diplomatic finesse, strengthened regional cooperation, and a deep understanding of the risks posed by the weakening of Iran’s proxies.

First, Egypt must enhance its naval presence in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean to safeguard the Suez from potential indirect threats, whether from Iranian proxies like the Houthis or other actors seeking to destabilize this critical waterway.  Egypt should also lead efforts to coordinate intelligence-sharing and military responses across North Africa, fortifying the region against rising instability. Recent regional agreements, such as the Abraham Accords, highlight how cooperation can drive new security dynamics, and Egypt should leverage its strategic partnerships with Gulf states and Israel to develop a unified defence network.  

By strengthening alliances, regional leaders can minimise the risk of geopolitical tremors from the Levant ricocheting across North Africa and the Maghreb. Proactive diplomacy and a robust and cohesive military strategy will be critical.

*Gavin Serkin is the author of Frontier: Exploring the Top Ten Emerging Markets of Tomorrow, and a Journalist and Consultant on emerging & frontier markets, with particular focus on Africa and the Middle East